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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--STATE LOYALTY OATH--
ARIZONA ACT INFRINGES ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. iI (1966).
Petitioner, an Arizona teacher and a Quaker, decided
she could not in good conscience execute a loyalty oath
required of all state employees, because she did not
understand its meaning and could not obtain a hearing
to determine its precise scope. The oath required the
usual affirmation of support for federal and state con-
stitutions, as well as the laws of Arizona. A statute
subjected to prosecution for perjury and discharge from
office any person taking the oath "who knowingly and
wilfully becomes or remains a member of the Communist
party of the United States or its successors or any of
its subordinate organizations or any other organization
having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force
or violence of the government of the state of Arizona
or any of its political subdivisions," if the employee
has knowledge of such unlawful purpose of the organiza-
tion. The Arizona Supreme Court sustained the oath in
petitioner's class action for declaratory relief1 and
on appeal the Supreme Court remanded the case for recon-
sideration2 in light of its holding in Baggett v.
Bullitt. 3 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed its ori-
ginal decisipn, but narrowly construed the meaning of
the statute.4 On certiorari, held, reversed. The
statute is unconstitutional because it excludes from
employment not only those who join with the "specific
intent" to further the illegal aims of the subversive
organization, but includes also those who join an
organization without actively supporting, though aware
of, its illegal aims; thus the oath is not "narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as consti-
tuting a clear and present danger" and consequently
unnecessarily infringes on the freedom of political
association. The explicit rationale for this decision
is that "those who join an organization but do not share
its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its
unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as
citizens or as public employees."5
The case at first glance would seem to be a further
extention of the doctrine of Baggett, in which it was
said that "the State may not require one to choose
between subscribing to an unduly vague and broad oath,
thereby incurring the likelihood of prosecution, and
conscientiously refusing to take the oath with the con-
sequent loss of employment, and perhaps profession,
particularly wh re 'the free dissemination of ideas may
be the loser.'"O
Yet Elfbrandt was a 5-4 decision, and Mr. Justice
White, who wrote the majority opinion in Baggett (a 7-2
decision), dissented here. This turn-about is under-
standable if we assume from the somewhat confusing
opinion of the Court that the case is not reversed
because the statute is "unduly vague" (the Arizona
court having narrowed it), but because it is "unduly
broad" in its coverage. The Arizona Supreme Court con-
strued the statute narrowly enough with respect to what
kind of conduct was reached so as not to be vague, B-T
i-definition of proscribed conduct was unconstitu-
tionally broad.
Freedom of Association
In Scales v. United States,7 a violation of the
membership clause of the Smith Act was sustained with
the specific caveat that "the clause does not make
criminal all associations with an organization which
has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy ...
[T~he member for whom the organization is a vehicle for
the advancement of legitimate aims and pplicies does
not fall within the ban of the statute."O Because the
Arizona Act embraces the person who is a member of a
multi-purpose organization, even when he supports only
the legal aims of the organization, the Court is making
its language in Scales its holding in Elfbrandt.
"Those who join an organization but do not partici-
pate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat,
either as citizens or as public employees."9 Henceforth,
only those who have knowledge of the organization's
illegal purposes, who support these aims and take an
active part in the organization's doings, can be dis-
charged from public office and convicted of a felony
under such a perjury statute.
Petitioner made much of the fact in her brief that
no hearing was provided by law for her to explain why
she refused to take the oath. "Laws such as this," says
the Court, "which are not restricted in scope to those
who join with the 'specific intent' to further illegal
action, impose, in effect, a conclusive presumption that
the member shares the unlawful aims of the organiza-
tion."10  In Scales, the Court said "there must be clear
proof that a defendant 'specifically intends to accom-
plish [the aims of the organization] by resort to vio-
lence.'"ll And the Court cites Speiser v. Randalll2 for
the proposition that a state may not place the burden
of proving noninvolvement in criminal advocacy on an
applicant for a tax exemption. The parallel here is
apt enough, since Arizona argued that because a govern-
ment job is a privilege and not a right, the government
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may condition it on a promise by prospective employees
not to join certain organizations. In a time when the
number of state and federal government Jobs is burgeon-
ing, the dangers of the "unconstitut onal conditions"
doctrineI3 are especially apparent.14
The statute with attached oath is a political-legal
device by which those who are members of organizations
which the state will not outlaw directly can be barred
from earning a living as an employee of the public and
possibly put in jail for perjury. This device gets at
that band of activities which are too "subversive" to
allow those who engage in them to hold any sensitive
public office (i.e., any job on the public payroll).
Reading Elfbrandt and Scales together, it becomes
apparent that unless the membe-ractively supports the
illegal aims of the organization, neither the perjury
nor loss of job provisions can now operate.
Mr. Justice Douglas declares that those who join
but do not "share its unlawful purposes" pose no threat.
This seems wrong, given the assumption of Dennis v.
United Statesl5 that the legislature may fi~ndtha Cer-
tain subversive organizations pose a threat; certainly
a legislature could find that membership per se is a
threat through the contribution of dues and the addi-
tion of a name to the organization's roster showing
that it has public support.
The seeming contradiction between Elfbrandt and
Dennis is not difficult to uncover. In Dennis under
thie ise of the "clear and present danger--est, the
conspiracy to advocate was held not protected by the
first amendment. If advocacy is dangerous, Mr. Justice
Douglas' assertion that active membership is not a
danger seems suspect. But significantly, if active
membership per se is not dangerous without the intent
to foster the illegal aims, as the Court now holds, then
perhaps the result in Dennis becomes suspect.
Dennis relied on a result-oriented test. Clear
and pre-sent danger purports to say that advocacy is bad
because its result is bad. Elfbrandt says, however,
that without the intention of supporting violent over-
throw, membership is permissible (a fortiori, since a
member cannot be dismissed from his job). Elfbrandt
relies on an intention-oriented test.
So following the requirement of Noto v. United
Statesl that a person must "specifically intend to
Laccomplish the aims of the organization] by resort to
violence," Elfbrandt provides a defense for the plaintiff
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in cases like Adler v. Board of EducationI7 if it doesnot overrule them outright.
In Adler, under the so-called Feinberg law of New
York, teachers who belonged to the Communist Party were
barred from teaching in public schools. The law was
held not to violate the fourteenth amendment. In the
suit for declaratory judgment, the Court said, "[F~rom
the fact found that the organization was one that advo-
cated the overthrow of the government by unlawful means
and that the person employed or to be employed was a
member of the organization and knew of its purpose, to
presume that such member is disqualified for employment
is [not] so unreaponable as to be a denial of due
process of law."1 The Court in Elfbrandt disagrees,
finding the presumption a denial of due process. Of
course, there was no oath in Adler. Yet Elfbrandt is
not, on balance, an oath case eit-her. Arizona could
have done what it did without the oath at all, by simply
warning a prospective public employee that should he
fail to quit his "subversive" associations or later join
one, he will lose his job and be liable for criminal
penalties.
Adler can be distinguished from Elfbrandt also by
the factthat the former had no criminal penalty. But
it is difficult to believe that this distinction is deci-
sive. For Elfbrandt said that those who do not partici-
pate in unlawful activities, though members of organiza-
tions which do, "surely pose no threat, either as citi-
zens or as public employees."19  The Court is thus say-
ing that even without criminal penalties (which makes
the case like Adler), the employee still cannot be dis-
missed from his- Job, without proof of unlawful intent
On this exact point, in fact, Justice White dissents. O
So the seeming confusion and contradiction in the
Elfbrandt opinion may be due simply to the fact that to
get a majority to agree to a switch from a result test
to an intention test (or to a result plus intention
test) requires some fudging. The reason for the switch
is clear: it is too easy to say a danger is clear and
present when it is fuzzy and distant. Proof of intent
makes it harder for the prosecutor to succeed and con-
sequently restricts the interference with first and
fourteenth amendment rights.
The question remains what bearing Elfbrandt has on
future loyalty oath cases. The fact that the Court con-
centrated on the broadness of the statutory coverage
suggests that the vagueness argument did not receive
its full attention. At the very least, when a case
comes up involving an oath not coupled to a statute,
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as here, Elfbrandt does not preclude a further testing
of how vague an oath must be before it falls.
The issue of what kind of conduct cannot be pro-
scribed (vagueness) runs into the issue of who cannot
do it (broadness of coverage). Ultimately,-Te penum-
bras splash together. The Court may simply be avoiding
a full interpretation of vagueness, since cases testing
more tightly written oaths may reach the Court this
year or next.
The Purpose of Simple Oaths
In a time when superstition and fear of God were
more pronounced than today, the oath of fealty to King
or Lord made sense. It was uttered in a ceremony with
mystic overtones and in a ritual of sometimes lavish
pomp.
Today's public employee loyalty oath, by contrast,
is conducted by bored officials in drab offices when it
is given orally at all. Often the act of taking the
oath simply consists of signing a slip of paper at home
and mailing it back to the state where eventually it
comes to rest in a filing cabinet.2 1
Since it is well known that those who would con-
spire to overthrow the lawful government by force and
violence are capable of lying, and that many people who
are not conspirators are deeply offended by loyalty
oaths on purely moral grounds, the oath (not coupled
with a statute making later knowing membership justifi-
cation for dismissal and/or a crime), serves but one
purpose.
It is a method by which the righteous can gain
psychic satisfaction by making all those they can reach
subscribe to their own views. "No passion is stronger
in the breast of man," wrote Virginia Woolf, "than the
desire to make others believe as he believes. Nothing
so cuts at the root of his happiness and fills him with
rage as the sense that another rates low what he prizes
high.122
In view of the Court's willingness to let an inten-
tion test govern, even simple "I support the Constitu-
tion" oaths, calculated to satisfy the True Believers,
may be invalid.2 3 For the Constitution places no direct
restraints on private citizens, except to forbid the
keeping of slaves,2 4 and the importation of liquor into
a state in violation of the state's own liquor laws.2 5
Thus a demand that an individual support the Constitu-
tion seems either unduly meaningless, or at the very
least, vague.
Consequently, a teacher's belief that income tax is
evil, or that a person ought to be able to sue a state
in federal court in contravention of the eleventh amend-
ment, or that school prayers ought to be allowed, should
be irrelevant to his opportunity to teach under the
Elfbrandt test.
The only permissible oath, then, would be one in
which the declarant says something like this: "I do
not, to my knowledge, belong to a group which incites
-its members or others to overthrow lawful government in
the United States by force or violence, in order to
establish its own government; or, if I do so belong or
should in the future come to belong, I do not personally
support the use of force or violence." The definition
of "government" would most likely be constitutionally
required to exclude "existing laws."
Let those who insist on oaths protest the fact that
such an oath is practically self-emasculating. Such
Elfbrandt may come to require. And even the above oath
might fail insofar as it proscribes violation of lairs
in order to bring about social or economic change.2b
In the light of the foregoing and of his opinion in
Baggett, Mr. Justice White's dissent here is surprising.
He starts--and some might say ends--with the proposition
that nothing in the judicial history of the Supreme
Court warrants the holding that a state loyalty oath is
per se unconstitutional. This may well be the truth,
but it is a non sequitur. To the restriction on freedom
of association, the Justice does not address himself,
except to cite precedents in line with his opinion with-
out replying directly to the majority's argument. If
precedents are now to be overruled or significantly dis-
tinguished and narrowed, it does not advance the con-
trary argument to point out that they are, after all,
precedents.
The disagreement in Elfbrandt stems in part from
the inability of the Court or any body of social scien-
tists to measure the effect of law on social or political
conduct. Until the day when this is possible, courts
must continue to decide cases by means of guesses and
hunches, generalized propositions like, "It will inhibit
the freedom to associate," or, "It will not."
Where the first amendment is concerned, perhaps it
is better to generalize in the direction of freedom.2 7
After Elfbrandt, draftsmen should catch far fewer of
the unwary in their nets.
-- Jethro K. Lieberman
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